The Rise Of The UFW Essay Research

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The Rise Of The UFW Essay, Research Paper
UFW History
The Rise of the UFW
For over a century farmworkers had been denied adequate life in the fields of California.
Farmworkers were necessary to the biggest industry of the state, but only if workers remained
cooperative and obedient. Many had tried but failed to coordinate the farmworkers. By the early
1960’s things were starting to revolutionize. Within two decades more over 50,000 farmworkers
were signed under union contractsi.
The Bracero program, an agreement between the United States and Mexican governments,
became Public Law 78 in 1951. The program to provide Mexican agricultural workers to
growers. Public Law 78 stated that no bracero, a temporary worker imported from Mexico, could
replace an American worker. However, the law was rarely enforced. Growers wanted the
Bracero program to persist after World War II because they wanted to replace domestic workers.
A small but active National Farm Labor Union, led by Ernesto Galarza, wanted to create a
lasting California farmworkers union in the 1940’s and 50’s. /Farmworkers, guided by Cesar
Chavez, were able rally up other unions. In churches and community groups, workers allied with
the growing civil rights movement to gain enough support on politicians to end the Bracero
Program by 1964.
But many things were unable to change. Grape pickers in 1965 were making an average of
$.90/hour, plus ten cents per basket picked. Growers ignored state laws regarding working
standards. At a ranch, workers were forced to pay a quarter for a cup of water. No ranches had
portable field toilets. Workers’ temporary housing was divided by race, and they paid two dollars
or more per day for shacks with no indoor plumbing or cooking facilities. Farm labor contractors
played favorites with workers, selecting friends first, sometimes accepting bribes. Child labor
was rampant, and many workers were injured or died in easily preventable accidents. The
average life expectancy of a farmworker was 49 years old.
Two organizations attempted to represent and organize the farmworkers. One had been formed
in 1959 by the AFL?CIO, called the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee. It was an
branch of an earlier farmworker organization, the Agricultural Workers Association (AWA).
AWOC was mostly composed of Filipinos, Chicanos, Anglos and Black workers. The Filipino
workers in particular had experience organizing unions in the fields and with strikes. Two of its
early leaders were Larry Itliong, a Filipino, and Dolores Huerta, a Chicana.
The National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) was started by a young Chicano named Cesar
Chavez in 1962.
Chavez had become the CSO?s national director. CSO worked with communities to solve
problems through organizing and direct action. But when CSO refused to concentrate its efforts
on organizing farmworkers, Chavez left to found the NFWA. From his base in Delano, he
traveled for three years from town to town in the central valleys of California, meeting with
groups of farmworkers in their homes, building an organization he hoped would one day become
an effective union. His cofounder was Dolores Huerta, one of the CSO’s farmworker activists.
Two strikes occurred in 1965. Eighty-five farmworkers in a McFarland rose farm asked the
NFWA to help them gain a wage increase. Assisted by Chavez and Huerta, the workers struck.
After a few days the growers agreed to the wage increase but not to union recognition. The
workers contented themselves with the money and returned to work. Around the same time
AWOC led a strike of hundreds of Filipino and Mexican grape pickers in Coachella Valley.
Although the bracero program had officially ended the year before, a new U.S.?Mexico
agreement allowed growers to import Mexican workers, if they were paid $1.25 an hour, and
never paid more than domestic workers. When Coachella grape growers attempted to pay the
local workers less than the imported workers, the Filipinos, many of whom were AWOC
members, refused to work. Getting the grapes picked and to market quickly is crucial to the
Coachella growers’ profits. After ten days the growers decided to pay everyone $1.25 per hour,
including Chicanos who had joined the Filipinos. However, no union contract was signed.
At the end of summer, many of the farmworkers from the successful Coachella action had come
up to Delano, trailing the grape harvest. Farmworkers demanded $1.25 per hour, and when they
didn’t receive it, on September 8 nine farms were struck, organized by AWOC’s Larry Itliong.
After five days growers began to bring in Chicano scabs from the surrounding area. AWOC
approached Chavez and asked the NFWA to join the mostly Filipino strike. At a meeting on
September 16, packed with hundreds of workers, the NFWA voted unanimously to strike too.
Chavez was apprehensive. Asked later when he felt his organization, which had $100 in its bank
account, would have been ready to go out on a big strike.
In joining the strike, the NFWA, with many more members than AWOC, took the lead. It also
strengthened the ethnic make up of the strike: now the majority of workers involved were
Chicano. By September 20 more than thirty farms were out, with several thousand workers
leaving the fields. Despite the large numbers of striking farmworkers, however, the workers
could not muster picket lines at all the ranches simultaneously. There were many fields strung
across hundreds of miles.
NFWA and AWOC set up a system of roving pickets, with different fields picketed each day.
Fifteen or twenty cars full of pickets would go to a field where a grower was attempting to use
strikebreakers. Striking workers, often harassed by the growers and police, sometimes violently,
would try to get the scabs to leave the fields. Remarkably, their appeals were successful much of
the time in persuading workers to join the strike.
The growers made a mistake almost immediately. They had always been able to end strikes with
small wage concessions. Soon after the strike began, they raised wages to $1.25 per hour. This
time they were shocked to discover it wasn’t enough. The raise merely encouraged the strikers to
believe they were being effective. Now there had to be a union, too.
Shortly after the strike erupted, Chavez called upon the public to boycott from buying grapes
without a union label. Union volunteers were sent out to big cities, where they established
boycott centers that organized friendly groups-unions, churches, community organizations-to not
buy grapes, and in turn to join in publicizing the boycott.
The two biggest growers in the Delano area, Schenley and DiGiorgio, were the most vulnerable
to the boycott. Both companies were owned by corporate entities with headquarters far from
Delano. For each company grape growing was a relatively minor part of a larger economic
empire. Schenley and DiGiorgio had union contracts with workers in many other parts of their
business. The boycott had the potential to hurt sales in other product areas, and to harm labor
relations with their other workers.
Schenley was the first to give in to the strike. Soon after the strike began Schenley had sprayed
striking workers with agricultural poisons. In protest the NFWA organized a march to
Sacramento. Seventy strikers left Delano and began a march on March 17, 1966, led by Chavez.
They walked nearly 340 miles in 25 days. Along the way they rallied with thousands of people.
Arriving in Sacramento, Chavez announced to a cheering demonstration of 10,000 supporters in
front of the Capitol building that Schenley had bowed before the pressure and signed an
agreement with the NFWA.
Within weeks, DiGiorgio agreed to hold a representation election. But before the election could
be held, a complication arose. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, ignoring the
questions of social justice at the core of the farmworkers’ campaign for union recognition,
offered itself to DiGiorgio as a conservative alternative to the NFWA/AWOC. The grower
eagerly assented. Chavez and the NFWA, infuriated at this betrayal by another union, called for
the workers to boycott the election. Heeding the call of the union, more than half the 800
workers at DiGiorgio’s huge Sierra Vista ranch refused to vote. Governor Pat Brown appointed
an arbitrator, who ordered another election. This time the NFWA beat the Teamsters decisively.
The two largest growers in Delano were employers of union labor.
However, the strike dragged on at dozens of grape farms throughout the Delano area. In the past
a farmworkers’ union would have been unable to survive such a long conflict. But there was
strength in worker solidarity. NFWA and AWOC merged during the summer, just before the
DiGiorgio election. On August 22, the two organizations became the United Farm Workers
Organizing Committee, AFL?CIO (UFWOC). The new union received organizing funds from
the AFL?CIO, as well as strike support from other unions consisting of food, cash, and office
equipment.
Despite continuing Teamster collusion with the growers, the UFWOC organized steadily in the
fields, and the grape boycott gathered steam in the cities. By 1970 the UFW got grape growers to
accept union contracts and effectively organized most of that industry, claiming 50,000 dues
paying member; the most ever represented by a union in California agriculture. A gain included
a union run hiring hall, a health clinic and health plan, credit union, community center and
cooperative gas station, as well as higher wages. The hiring hall meant an end to discrimination
and favoritism by labor contractors.
In cities around the country UFW support became stronger. UFWOC had become both a union
and a civil rights movement, and this was the key to its success. The dual character of the
farmworkers organization gave it a depth of moral pressure and sense of mission felt by
members and supporters alike. It seemed as if the farmworkers of California had finally created a
union that would last.
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